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4.1 IntroductionINTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines UK social policy in the UK as directed attoward people who are out-of-work on a long-
term basis due to a chronic illness or disability (Gabbay et al., 2011). A ‘disability’, in this context, is defined as 
an illness or impairment that limits the usual activities of daily living, including work ability (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD) 2009:, p. 11). Across advanced market democracies, poor 
health is a significant risk factor for unemployment, as well as remaining unemployed. In 2018, in the UK, the 
UK employment rates of for people with a disability are was 51%, compared to 81% of for those without an 
illness or disability (House of Commons Library, 2 2018). There is was also a small gender gap, with women 
with a disability having a slightly lower employment rate of 51% than men with a disability (51% vs. 52%) 
(House of Commons Library, 2 2018). People with a disability in the UK are also 50% more likely to work part-
time: 24% of people with disabilities were working part-time compared to 36% of people without disabilities 
(House of Commons Library, 2 2018). However, disability-related unemployment is also unequally distributed 
both socio-economically and geographically distributed. Men and women from lower educational or 
occupational backgrounds are significantly more likely to experience disability-related unemployment in the 
UK, as well as –  and in other European countries (Pope and Bambra, 2 2005; Bambra and Pope, 2 2007). The 
employment of people with a disability in the UK is also geographically skewed, with the lowest rates in de-
industrialiszed areas reflecting wider patterns of ill health and unemployment (Norman and Bambra, 2 2007). In 
2018, for example, the employment rate was highest for people with a disability was highest in the South East of 
England (58%), and lowest in Scotland (45%), Wales (43%), the North East of England (41%), and Northern 
Ireland (35%) (House of Commons Library, 2 2018). Poverty, social exclusion, as well asand downward social 
mobility are also important issues for people with a disability in the UK (Bambra 2011a).  
Commented [A1]: Please note that, in the final published 
volume, every chapter’s ‘title page’ will feature a footnote 
detailing each chapter author’s name (presented as they 
would be cited), affiliations, e-mail addresses, and telephone 
numbers (the telephone numbers will not be published but 
may be needed as contact information during the publishing 
process; ditto private email addresses, but note that 
professional email addresses will be published). Accordingly, 
please supply these details as part of the final manuscript 
submission to the publisher. Thank you. 
Commented [A2R1]: added 
2 
 
 
As in Like most other advanced market economies, the UK state provides financial support to individuals whose 
unemployment is then, disability-related, unemployment carries an entitlement to receipt of financial support 
from the UK state in the form of sickness and disability pensions (as described insee Box 1) (Bambra, 2 2011b). 
Rates of receipt of these disability-related benefits have increased rapidly since the 1970s: in the UK, they have 
increased from 0.5 million recipients in 1975 to 2 million in 2018, – meaning that around 7% of the UK working 
age population was incurrently receivespt of disability-related benefits (Office for National Statistics, 2 2018). 
This accounts for over 10% of UK social security expenditure and, almost 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Gabbay et al., 2011). The probability of returning to work after being in receivingpt of long-term health-related 
benefits is just 2% annually (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOECD, 2 2003,; 2009), 
with most recipients who have been workless for six months or more having only a 20% chance of returning to 
work within five years (Wardell and Burton, 2 2006). The most common causes of long-term sickness absence 
in the UK are musculoskeletal conditions (including obesity-related conditions) and mental health problems 
(including drug and alcohol addictions) (Black, 2 2016).  
 
Box 1: The Main UK Ddisability-related Ssocial Ssecurity Bbenefits in the UK (1994 to date) 
 
 
Incapacity Benefit (1994-2008) replaced Invalidity Benefit in 1994. It was a non-means-tested social security 
cash benefit, paid to people in the UK who were medically certified as being incapable of work due to illness 
or disability and who had contributed sufficient National Insurance payments. Incapacity Benefit was paid at 
a higher rate than usual unemployment benefit (c.33% higher). It was similar in remit to the long-term 
sickness and disability insurance schemes of other Western countries, such as the USA’s Social Security 
Disability Insurance and the disability pensions of Germany and Sweden. There were three rates of 
Incapacity Benefit. In the including two short-term, rates: a lower rate which was paid for the first 28 weeks 
of sickness, and a higher rate for weeks 29 to 52. The third, (a long-term) rate, applied to people who had 
been sick for more than a year; this group and comprised the largest number of claimants. Incapacity Benefit 
could be received up to pensionable age. It was discontinued in 2008 and gradually replaced for new and 
existing recipients with the Employment and Support Allowance.  
 
Employment and Support Allowance (2008-2017)date) was introduced in 2008 to replace Incapacity Benefit. 
It has a two-tier system of benefits, based on. Those judged (via a medically -administered Work Capability 
Assessment.) Those judged unable to work or with limited work capacity due to the severity of their physical 
or mental condition receive a higher level of benefit with no conditionality. By contrast, Tthose who are 
deemed ‘sick but able to work’ – the work-related activity group –- only receive an additional Employment 
Support premium if they participate in employability initiatives. Those who fail to do so Failure to participate 
in such programmes results in the removal of the Employment Support component and recipients are then 
only entitled to the basic Employment and Support Allowance (paid at the same rate as unemployment 
benefit – Jobseeker’s Allowance). Since 2010, receipt of Employment and Support Allowance for the ‘work-
related activity’ group is limited to a maximum of one1 year.   
 
Universal Credit (since 2017) is a single working- age benefit which replaced Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(unemployment benefit), Income Support (means-tested social assistance), and Employment and Support 
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Allowance (disability-related benefit) from 2015 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2 2010b). Compulsory 
work-for-benefit, as well as a ‘claimant contract’ with benefit sanctions (of three3 months’, six6 months’, and 
or up to three3 years’ benefit removal for those benefit recipients who refuse to take upaccept a job offer), are 
key components of Universal Credit, – and they apply to recipients of all, benefit recipients including 
disability-related, benefits ones. 
 
 
Concern over the rising numbers of disability-related benefit recipients  has meant that in the UK, like as in 
most other European countries, disability-related benefits have had a high political profile over the last three 
decades. This has led to substantial changes to rehabilitation medicine, vocational services, and the social 
security support provided to on the basis of disabledility people. Rehabilitation medicine in the UK is both 
clinical (provided by the National Health Service (– NHS)) and vocational (provided by the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP)). Rehabilitation Medicine in the UKIt can be broadly divided into: neurological 
rehabilitation (including brain, spinal cord, and peripheral nerve conditions and injuries), musculoskeletal 
rehabilitation, and mental health conditions (Royal College of Physicians, 2 2010). The latter two conditions 
account for over 60% of unemployment amongst people with a disability. All areas of clinical rehabilitation 
medicine practice include the management of pain, health and employment behaviours, emotional disturbances, 
and cognitive issues (Royal College of Physicians, 2 2010). In   Tthe provision of rehabilitation services, in the 
UK lags behind other European countries: though – with, for example, it has only 0.26 rehabilitation specialist 
doctors per 100,000 population, compared to 1.88 in Sweden and 2.87 in France (Ward, 2 2005). Rehabilitation 
medicine also works closely with vocational rehabilitation services to promote employment opportunities for 
disabled adults of working age, working in liaison with occupational medicine, occupational therapists, 
vocational services, and employers (Royal College of Physicians, 2 2010). 
 
 This chapter focuses on the vocational aspects of rehabilitation medicine in the UK, examining key policy 
regime shifts in the UK context. – It outlinesing the moves away from the passive welfare of the 1970s and 
1980s (typified by compulsory employment quotas and passive welfare benefits); through the active welfare of 
the 1990s and 2000s (including antidiscrimination legislation, welfare to work, and active welfare benefits); to 
the workfare approach entrenched in the present system and accelerated under austerity (typified by benefit 
sanctions, benefit cuts, and compulsory work-for-benefit). These significant social policy shifts are then 
analysed from a political economy perspective, – exploring the broad context of the neoliberal restructuring of 
the state and the specific issues of the reassertiong of labour discipline and the reclassifyingication of people 
with a disability from ‘deserving’ to ‘undeserving’ subjects (Bambra and Smith, 2 2010; Bambra, 2 2011a; 
Schrecker and Bambra, 2 2015). 
 
4.2 The Evolution of UK Disability PolicyTHE EVOLUTION OF UK DISABILITY 
POLICY 
This section summarizses the historical evolution of UK social policy for people with a disability in the UK 
from 1944 to the present today. It identifies and outlines four key and distinct phases: (1) ‘passive welfare’;, (2) 
‘active welfare’; (3) ‘towards workfare’; and (4) ‘austerity’. The effectsiveness of these policy changes on the 
employment of people with a disability are also examined, noting their limited impacts that they have had.  
 
4.2.1 Passive Wwelfare (1970s to 1990s) 
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The first phase of UK public policy towards the employment of people with a disability in the UK was framed 
by the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act of 1944, under which set up supported employment programmes 
(such as Remploy), medical rehabilitation services, and the post-war employment quota were established 
(Fig.ure 4.1). In the 1970s, these measures were supplemented with by a number ofseveral specific health-
related out-of-work cash benefits for out-of-work individuals, such as Invalidity Benefit in 1971 (renamed 
Incapacity Benefit in 1994). Cash benefits claimed on the basis of iIll- health- based cash benefits were higher 
than those paid on the basis of unemployment benefits, in which recognizedtion of the long-term nature of ill 
health and the additional associated costs that it can involve (Bambra, 2 2011a). During tThe social security 
reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s placed, additional restrictions were placed on these cash benefits (e.g. the 
introduction of the ‘all work’ test in 1994). However, a radical shift of policy, fuelled by growing government 
concerns about the costs of disability- related benefits, alongside pressure from disability campaign groups in 
relation toregarding social exclusion (Barnes, 1991), a more radical policy shift occurred in the mid-1990s.  
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Fig.ure 4.1. : ‘Passive Welfare’ Phase of UK Disability Policy (1944 to 1994). (Adapted 
from Bambra et al. 2005) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Bambra et al (2005).  
 
 
The Disability Discrimination Act of 1995 (and subsequent amendments) abolished the post-war disability 
employment quota and instigated favour of a more rights-based approach to the employment of disabled people 
(Oliver and Barnes, 1998). This Act saw the beginning ofintroduced a distinction in social policy between 
people with a legally recognizsed disability (including limiting long term illnesses) and those with other forms 
of chronic illness. Key features of Tthe Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (later subsumed into the wider 
Equalities Act in 2010) – isare described presented in Box 2).  
  
1944 Disabled Persons (Employment) Act  
Set upLaunched the post-war disability employment quota of 3% for employers with over 20 
staff. Some vocational services initiated and special, initially sheltered, employment started 
(‘Remploy’). 
 
1970 Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 
Improved access to local authority public buildings and services 
 
1971 National Insurance Act 
Invalidity benefit set upestablished 
 
1973 Employment and Training Act 
Introduced employment rehabilitation centres and resettlement officers 
 
Social Security Act 
Attendance Allowance introduced: - subsidieses for the costs of home care/assistance 
 
1975 Social Security Benefits Act 
Introduced the Mobility Allowance: – a cash benefit paid for transport costs 
 
Social Security Pensions Act 
Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension (later known as Severe Disablement Allowance)  
 
1980 Social Security Act 
Reduced benefit levels 
  
1991 Disability Living Allowance and Disability Working Allowance Act 
Disability Living Allowance combined the Attendance and Mobility Aallowances., 
 Disability Working Allowance: - wage top-up for low-paid workers (replaced with a tax credit 
in 1999) 
 
Placement, Assessment and Counselling Teams (PACTs) 
Vocational preparation and placement services (renamed Disability Service Teams in 1999) 
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Box 2: Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (now subsumed into the wider Equalities Act, 2010) 
 
The 1995 UK Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) made it illegal to discriminateion on the grounds of 
physical or mental disability or limiting long-term illness illegal: since the its implementation of the DDA 
fromin 1996, onwards it has been unlawful to ‘“discriminate against disabled persons in connection with 
employment, the provision of goods, facilities and services, or the disposal or management of premises ”’.   
Employers are required to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ to work and premises to cater for people with a 
disability.  
Under tThe Act,  defines disability is defined as: “‘a physical or mental impairment that has a substantial 
and long-term adverse effect on [the individual’s]his/her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities”’:  
• Physical impairment –  this includes weakening or adverse change of a part of the body 
caused through illness, by accident or from birth such as blindness, deafness, heart disease, 
the paralysis of a limb or severe disfigurement. 
• Mental impairment –  this can include learning disabilities and all recognizsed mental 
illnesses.  
• Substantial - this does not have to be severe, but is more than minor or trivial.  
• Long-term adverse effect –  that has lasted or is likely to last more than 12 months.  
• A normal day-to-day activity –  that is, one that affects one of the following: mobility; 
manual dexterity; physical co-ordination; continence; ability to lift, carry or otherwise move 
everyday objects; speech, hearing or eyesight; memory or ability to concentrate, learn or 
understand; or perception of the risk of physical danger.   
 
4.2.2 Active Wwelfare (1990s to 2000s) 
Although tThe UK welfare state has always contained an certain element of active welfare: (for example, many 
of the initial post-war cash benefits, such as pensions, were only available to those who had previously paid 
social insurance contributions in the form of nNational Insurance payments contributions ([Fulcher and Scott, 2 
2003])., However, in more recent decades this element feature has become more prominent and far reaching in 
recent decades. In the second phase of government action, people with a disability or long-term condition were 
re-conceptualizsed as a key group of working-age benefit recipients and, as such, they werebecame the targets 
of activation policies and subject to a number of diverse active labour market policies - (ALMPs). ‘Activation’ 
has also emerged as one of thea dominant reform themes of reform across other European welfare states, with 
benefits and services for working-age people of working age becoming more focused on re-connecting 
recipients with the labour market, and requiring recipients them to be ‘actively’ in seeking employment 
(Houston and Lindsay, 2 2010). In the UK, for example, the early ALMPs of the Disability Working Allowance, 
the New Deal for Disabled People, and the Access to Work programme were all early active labour market 
policies targeted at people with a disability in the 1990s (Fig.ure 4.2). These interventions generally tried to 
overcome the different barriers faced by which people with a disability or chronic illness face when trying to 
enter employment, including: lack of experience or skills; employers’ uncertainty from employers; problems 
with physical access to work; and concerns over pay, hours, and conditions (Goldstone and Meager, 2 2002). 
However, the majority of interventions focused on the were supply -side focused, with little consideration of 
account taken for actual labour market demand (Bambra, 2 2006). In this period, participation by  people in 
receipt of benefits recipients was largely on a voluntary basis (Bambra et al., 2005).  
 
4.2.3 Towards ‘workfare’ (2003 to 2010)  
Despite a rapid increase in the use of ALMPs in the UK since the 1990s, the employment rate for people with a 
disability remained very low. In the 2000s, there were still over 2.5 million people in receivingpt of disability-
related benefits in the UK. They remained, therefore, at the centre of the welfare reform agenda, with the 
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benefits of (re)employment for health and well-being increasingly being emphasizsed in policy circles (Black, 2 
2008). Voluntary Eengagement with ALMPs was replaced ceased to be voluntary asby compulsory engagement 
and conditionality became in the new policy approach. In 2003, for example, pilots for the Pathways to Work 
programme pilots introduced compulsory Work Focused Interviews for all new benefit recipients (Fig.ure 4.3). 
and, mMost significantly, in 2008, Incapacity Benefit was phased out for new recipients and replaced with the 
two-tiered Employment and Support Allowance – (ESA) (see Box.1).  
 
Using a new test administered by the private sector administered test (by first Atos, between and , andthen 
Maximus since), called the Work Capability Assessment (WCA), the ESA required all but the most severely 
sick or disabled recipients to be work-ready by, for example, taking part inundergoing rehabilitation or 
retraining (Warren et al., 2014). All existing Incapacity Benefit recipients were gradually re-evaluated and 
moved onto ESA or the lower-value Jobseeker’s Allowance (unemployment benefit). The use ofContracting 
private sector providers to deliver the WCA has been criticized qued on the basis that itfor incentivizingsed 
companies to turn down claims rejection, as well as being that it was expensive, impersonal, mechanistic, and 
lacked insufficiently transparent,cy and led towith a high rate of appeals (Warren et al., 2014). The ESA 
introduced new distinctions between disability-related recipients: (1) those deemed ‘fit for work’ - were 
immediately transferred onto the lower-paying Jobseeker’s Allowance (which is a very conditional benefit 
worth around a third less in cash per week); (2) those deemed to be too ‘incapacitated’ for work were placed on 
the Employment and Support AllowanceESA with a ‘support’ premium and with no conditionality (only a 
minority offew recipients met the threshold for this classification); and (3) whilst those considered ‘sick but able 
to work’ were placed on Employment and Support AllowanceESA with a ‘work-related activity’ premium (see 
Box 1). Those in the third group who Ffailedure to engage in compulsory ‘work-related activity’ for group 2 
resulted in a losts of the premium and received only the ESA placement on the Employment and Support 
Allowance basic rate (worth a third less than the ‘work related activity’ benefit).  
 
In addition,Also during this period, a new ‘fit note’ replaced the old Ggeneral Ppractitioner-administered ‘sick 
note’ (Department for Work and PensionsDWP, 2 2009). The ‘sick note’ which was traditionally used by 
Ggeneral Ppractitioners (primary care physicians) to certify sickness absence operated on a zero-sum basis: an 
individual was either too sick to work or well enough to work. The aim of the ‘fit note’ was instead intended to 
assess fitness for work, as opposed to sickness,. The fit note addings the option of being partially fit for work if 
certain issues were are taken into account, including a phased return to work, altered hours, amended duties, and 
workplace adaptations. The intention of the fit note was intended to reduce the number of people on short-term 
sickness absence who then lose their employment and become long-term benefit recipients. The fit noteIt was 
also intended to address concerns that Ggeneral Ppractitioners were too close to their patients and too keen to 
sign people off –- ‘on the sick’ – (particularly in areas or times of high unemployment) (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOECD, 2 2009). 
 
Although these new reforms clearly built on the previous period of active welfare reform, the addition of such 
overt conditionality for people in receivingpt of disability-related benefits marked a new turn within the UK 
social policy, context - signalling a clear break with from the voluntary nature of previous participation in 
ALMPs (Bambra and Smith, 2 2010). It tTherefore, it arguably marked the beginning of a third phase of policy 
towards the employment of people with a disability, and one which could be considered asdistinguished by a 
move towards making subjecting these recipients subject to a form of ‘workfare’ (Bambra, 2 2011a). Indeed, in 
a government report titled Building Bridges to Work, the government explicitly stated that “‘the old-style, 
passive, incapacity benefits have been replaced by the new, active Employment and Support Allowance”’ 
(Department for Work and PensionsDWP, 2 2010:, p. 7). in a bidThe aim was to create a “‘something for 
something”’ approach that aims to widens “‘the right to support and deepens the responsibility to take up this 
support: individuals have the responsibility to move towards and into work, in return they should get the help 
they need to do so”’ (Department for Work and PensionsDWP, 2 2010:, p. 21).  
 
4.2.4 Austerity (since 2011)  
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The term ‘workfare’ is used to refers to those welfare reforms that have linked participation in employment 
programmes to ongoing receipt the maintenance of benefits receipt. Workfare is, thus, the obligation on welfare 
recipients to ‘earn’ their benefit payments via compulsory participation in training or compulsory ‘work-for-
benefit’ style employment, (including compulsory voluntary work for charities) (Burghes, 1987; Gibson et al., 
2018). Workfare originated in the USA and most well-known arewith the Clinton-era reforms of 1996, when the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) introduced sanctions and benefit 
limits for millions of poor Americans, particularly lone mothers and their children: the so-called ‘99ers’ (as 
benefit receipt is limited to 99 weeks). The PRWORA was considered a success, as welfare rolls more than 
halved in the first five years, from 12.2 million in 1996 to 5.3 million in 2001. However, the social and 
economic costs for individuals are have been far more problematic, with only around 10-20% of those leaving 
welfare rolls actually getting workfinding employment that pays above the federal poverty line (Bambra, 2 
2011a).  
 
Similar ‘workfare-’ style reforms for disability-related benefits were enacted in the UK from 2010 onwards as 
part of the national austerity programme (Fig.ure 4.4). In economics, ‘austerity’ refers to reducing budget 
deficits in economic downturns by decreasing public expenditure, particularly on welfare, and/or increasing 
taxes (Bambra et al., 2016). Since 2010, the UK government, as a has respondedse to the economic recession 
that followed the 2007/8 global financial crisis,  by implementinged a programme of austerity. This has been 
characterizsed by large scale cuts to central and local government budgets, health care (NHS) privatiszation, and 
associated cuts in to welfare services and benefits. Reductions in to local government budgets and welfare cuts 
have hit the poorest parts of the country hardest (Beatty and Fothergill, 2 2016), and the effects of tax and 
benefit reforms haves largely been regressive, with low- income households of working age losing the most 
(Browne and Levell 2010).  Working-age benefits were have been particularly targeted, – including disability-
related benefits, with reductions, restrictions, and the introduction of sanctions (Bambra, 2 2016; Bambra et al., 
2016).  
 
ESA itself was reformed further in 2011, which meant thatlimiting entitlement to ESA to one year for recipients 
in the ‘work-related activity’ group saw their entitlement to Employment and Support Allowance limited to one 
year. After onea year, they had no right to insurance-based benefits (not even Jobseeker’s Allowance), and 
therefore so becoame reliant on support from their family, charities, or means-tested public assistance (Income 
Support). For the great majority of recipients, ESA therefore thus became a temporary benefit, – designed to 
‘activate the aspirations’ of recipients and encourage them to look for and take up paid work, and marking a 
shift in the ‘culture’ of incapacity benefits’ from ‘invalidity to employability’ (Bambra , 2 2011a). In 2012, a 
‘claimant contract’ with benefit sanctions (of three3 months’, six6 months’, and or up to three3 years’ benefit 
removal) was introduced for all ‘active’ benefits: the sanctions- applied to those recipients who refused to take 
upaccept a job offer or missed their appointments with vocational services . In 2015, the value of the ‘work-
related activity’ element of ESA was reduced to the level of Jobs Seeker’s Allowance, thus removing (JSA) 
levels – losing the  previous premium of a 33% higher rate of in weekly cash.income. 
 
 Then, in 2011, withWith the announcement of the phased rollout of the new Universal Credit benefit, which 
began in 2013 and continues today (see Box 1), ESA itself was is being gradually abolished – with a rolled-out 
transfer of existing recipients on to the new benefit between 2013-2019. Universal Credit (UC) is a single 
working- age benefit intended to which replaced Jobseeker’s Allowance (unemployment benefit), Income 
Support (means-tested social assistance), and Employment and Support AllowanceESA (disability-related 
benefit) from 2015. Compulsory work-for-benefit and the claimant contract are key components of Universal 
Credit, – and they apply to all recipients of all benefits recipients, including disability-related onespayments. 
Other significant welfare reforms applied to all working age benefits (such as the under-occupancy charge [more 
commonly referred to as the ‘Bedroom Tax’]) which were applied to all working age benefits,have also 
impacted on disability-related benefit claimants (for a full overview of austerity and welfare reform, see 
Schrecker and Bambra, 2 2015). 
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4.2.5 Employment effects of policy changes  
The shifts from passive to active/workfare approaches to disability support were justified by politicians and 
policymakers in as means to terms of increaseing the employment and labour market participation of people 
with a disability. However, various evidence reviews of the effectiveness of such ALMPs and restrictions to 
benefit entitlements restrictions have found very little evidence that they have actuallyof enhanced positive 
contribution to the employment of disabled people with a disability (Bambra et al., 2005; Bambra, 2 2006; Barr 
et al., 2010; Clayton et al., 2011, 2012). For example, one review concluded that “‘no large-scale programme 
has demonstrated through a scientifically rigorous study that it improves employment rates by more than a few 
percentage points”’ (Bambra, 2 2006); whilst another found that benefit restrictions have had no positive 
impacts on employment (Barr et al., 2010). UK policy has largely focused on supply-side measures, – rather 
than trying to increase employer demand (Bambra, 2 2006, 2011a). 
 
Supply-side ALMP interventions (such as training, work placements, advice and support services, or in-work 
benefits) are concerned with increasing the availability and work readiness of individuals with a disability . 
Accordingly, they and are designed to overcome some of the employment barriers which faced by people with a 
disability face, particularly in terms oftheir lack of skills or work experience, and financial uncertainty about the 
transition into paid employment. The UK evidence suggests that some training and advice interventions can 
have small positive impacts on employment rates, depending on the characteristics of participants, such as ‘job-
readiness’ or type of illness, as well as the local labour market context (Bambra et al ., 2005). However, given 
the small-scale and poor-quality nature of the of intervention evaluations, were such that it is impossible to 
determine if the improved employment chances were due to the effectiveness of the interventions themselves or 
to external factors, such as a general upturn in employment rates in the early 2000s. There was is little evidence 
that in-work benefits were effective in increasing employment (Bambra, 2 2006).   
 
More Further workfare-style interventions (including benefit restrictions, sanctions, and conditionality) can also 
be considered as another a type of supply-side ALMP intervention, - albeit a very radical one, which that aims to 
increase the employment of disabled people with disability by making it harder for them to survive outside the 
labour market. Barr et al. (2010) performed Aan international systematic review of the employment effects of 
restricting entitlements to welfare benefits for people with a disability, considering in the UK, Canada, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. They concluded that: “‘there is insufficient evidence, and what there is [is] 
equivocal, to indicate whether [restrictive] changes in benefit eligibility requirements ... will have an impact on 
the employment of people with disabilities and chronic illness in well- developed welfare states”’ (Barr et al., 
2010, p1106). Further,Another international research study also suggests that conditionality interventions raise 
employment rates in non-disabled people, but lowers them among disabled people (Baumberg, 2 2017). When 
examiningResearch in the UK context,links the WCA has been associated withto increases in poordeterioration 
in mental health amongst those assessed (Barr et al., 2016), and benefit sanctions have been associated with 
decreased return to work amongst disabled people (National Audit Office, 2016). and aAlthough the evidence is 
inconclusiveunclear as to why this is the case, there is somea suggestedion explanation for this latter finding is 
that people completely drop out of the system, preferring to suffer economic hardship or rely on unreported 
income or support from local authorities, charities, or friends and family (National Audit Office, 2 2016). 
 
Demand-side ALMP interventions (such as financial incentives for employers, disability discrimination 
legislation, and accessibility interventions) focus on increasing the demand for disabled workers amongst 
employers (Bambra, 2 2006). They are attempts to combat the other type of employment barriers faced by 
people with a disability: employer uncertainty and the physical difficulties of workplaces. Demand- side 
interventions have been less well used within the UK context (Bambra, 2 2006,; 2011a),. The UKwith evidence 
base suggestings that such interventions have only a very limitedtheir impact on employment has been very 
limited. For example, financial interventions designed to incentivizse employers were ineffective because they 
did not adequately off-set the perceived risks and costs of employing a disabled person (Bambra, 2 2006). 
Likewise, Ddisability legislation likewise had no effect on employers’ recruitment decisions, (with the majority 
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of employers unaware of its employment provisions) (Roberts et al., 2004); and that the employment gap 
between those with and without a health condition or disability actually increased after the introduction of the 
Disability Discrimination Act was introduced (Pope and Bambra, 2 2005). Only accessibility interventions 
(workplace adjustments) appear to have a more positive employment impact , but there was very low uptake 
across by employers has been very low (Clayton et al., 2012). 
 
4.3 The political economy of UK disability policy 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UK DISABILITY POLICY 
Adding conditionality, in the form ofThrough compulsory involvement in ALMPs, sanctions, and time-limits on 
benefit receipt, in terms of UK policy on disability-related benefits has clearly abandoned marks a clear break 
with the ‘passive’ approach that dominated characterized UK policy for the majoritymost of the post-war period. 
However, embracing conditionality it is in keepingconsistent with the reform of other UK out- of- work benefits 
(such as the reforms to unemployment benefit of the 1980s and 1990s) and changes to disability-related benefits 
elsewhere, such as in Australia, the USA, and other EU countries in the European Union (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOECD, 2 2009). In the UK, these welfare reforms are usually 
presented (by politicians from both the centre- left and centre- right) as being initiated on the groundsattempts to 
of reintroduceing recipients to the labour market or providing an incentivize unemployed for people who are out 
of work to look forseek and return to work. However, the application of a political economy perspective 
approach provides an alternative explanation seeing for these disability reforms, framing them as a key part of 
the wider neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state; and specifically, they contribute to in terms of the 
reassertiong of labour discipline and the reclassifyingication of people with a disability from ‘deserving’ toas the 
‘undeserving’ poor (Bambra and Smith, 2 2010; Bambra, 2 2011a; Schrecker and Bambra, 2 2015).  
 
4.3.1 The Nneo-liberaliszation of the Wwelfare Sstate 
The different phases of disability policy in the UK reflect wider trends in the general development of the welfare 
state. Indeed, more generally with the most recent shift towards workfare representing is the culmination of the 
neo-liberalizsation project to ‘hollow out’ the welfare state (Rhodes, 1994).  
 
For most of the 19th nineteenth Ccentury, there was minimal state provision of welfare beyond very basic 
“‘poor relief”’. – the provision ofcomprising basic food rations and shelter (often provided via institutions, such 
as the English workhouse system). Beyond these provisions, welfare came via family members or charity 
(particularly the Church). This began to change in the early 20th twentieth century with the introduction of 
rudimentary and highly selective (non-workers which included most women were typically excluded from such 
schemes) state- organizsed welfare systems, which provided basic pensions, unemployment, and sickness 
benefits funded via social insurance payments (e.g. the 1911 National Insurance Act in the UK or the 
Bismarckian welfare reforms of 1880s Germany). Such schemes were highly selective in terms of population 
coverage, typically excluding non-workers, and therefore most women. 
 
It was not until after the Second World War (1945) that a more comprehensive welfare state –- what is often 
referred to astermed the ‘Keynesian welfare state’ –- was established in most market democracies. To a greater 
or lesser extent, this ‘golden age’ of welfare state capitalism was characteriszed by centralism, universalism, and 
Keynesian economics. Keynesian economic models entailed ( active macroeconomic management by the state, 
such as interventionist fiscal policy, a large public sector, and a mixed economy), full (male, able -bodied) 
employment, and high public expenditure, and the promotion of mass consumption via a more redistributive tax 
and welfare system. There was also a mainstream political consensus in favour of the welfare state and the 
redistribution it encompassed. In the ‘golden age’ of welfare state expansion (1940s to 1960s), Western 
countries experienced significant improvements to public housing and, health care, with and workers enjoyeding 
their highest ever share of national income ever (Schrecker and Bambra, 2 2015).  
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However, ‘Ggolden- age’ welfare states varied though considerably in the services they provided and the 
generosity and coverage of social insurance and welfare benefits  (Esping-Anderson, 1990).  Broadly speaking, 
tThe UK welfare states was a broadly liberal welfare regime (alongside like the other Anglo-American countries 
of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United StatesUSA). State provision of welfare was fairly 
minimal;, social insurance benefits were modest and often attracted had strict entitlement criteria; and recipients 
were often subject to means-testing, with and receipt was stigmatiszed. In this model, even in the post-war 
period, the dominance of the market was encouraged by the state only guaranteeing only a minimum level of 
state support, and alongside by the subsidiszing of private welfare schemes. A stark division existed between 
those, largely the poor, who relied on state aid (largely the poor) and those who were able to afford private 
provision.   
 
This ‘golden age of the welfare state’ effectively ended with the economic crisis of the 1970s (when rising oil 
prices combined with high inflation and high unemployment), combined with and the simultaneous rise of 
neoliberalism – or ‘market fundamentalism’ – as the dominant political and economic ideology (Schrecker and 
Bambra, 2 2015). The fundamental presuppositions of neoliberalism are as follows: (1) that markets are the 
normal, natural, and preferable way of organiszing human interaction; (2) the primary function of the state is to 
ensure the efficient functioning of markets; and (3) institutions or policies that lead towhose outcomes different 
from those thatwhat would be expected from in a functioning market require justification (Ward and England, 2 
2007). The core tenets of neoliberalism remained on the margins of mainstream politics in the wealthy world 
until the 1970s (Harvey, 2 2005). At that point, the economic uncertainties of ‘stagflation’ – the simultaneous 
occurrence of high inflation and high unemployment – “‘created a newly receptive climate among both elites 
and, in many countries, electorates”’ (Schrecker and Bambra, 2 2015, p13).  
 
The literature offers Vvarious narratives of the advance of neoliberalism can be found in the literature. One 
regards neoliberal policies as pragmatic responses to a changing global economic environment , that was largely 
outside the control of individual national governments. Under these new conditions, neoliberal policies were the 
only ones that ‘worked’ (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2 2005).  Another views neoliberalism as a political 
project aimed at the restoringation of the class power of business (capital), which that had been eroded by the 
rise of the welfare state and associated redistributive policies (Harvey, 2 2005).  It is clear, however, that 
neoliberalism is best understood as having multiple dimensions, including: concrete policy programmes and 
innovations (e.g. scaling back the welfare state);, more general reorganizsation of state institutions (e.g. 
privatizsation and contracting-out);, and an implicit ideology that gives primacy to the individual, as opposed to 
the collective. The latter is – exemplified by Margaret Thatcher’s (in)famous comment: that “‘there is no such 
thing as society, only individuals and their families”’ (Ward and England, 2 2007). 
 
The elections of the Thatcher’s Conservatives government of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in (1979), (and of 
Republican  USA president Ronald Reagan as US president (in 1980), and or Helmut Kohl as in West Germany 
Chancellor in (1982) represented key turning points. The political consensus of the golden age began to break 
down as governments started to dismantle and restructure the welfare state.  The ‘reforms’ were characterizsed 
by the privatiszation and marketiszation of welfare services; entitlement restrictions and increased stricter 
qualifying conditions for welfare benefits;, and a shift towards targeting and means testing; cuts or limited 
increases to the actual cash values of benefits; modified funding arrangements (with a shift away from business 
taxation and towards consumption taxes); an increased emphasis on an active, rather than a passive, welfare 
systempolicies; deregulation of the economy, with the promotion of labour market flexibility, supply-side 
economics, and a desire to minimizse public social expenditure; and the subordination of social policy to the 
market demands of the market (Bambra et al., 2010).  This significantly reduced the support provided to people 
when they are out of work. Analysis of the unemployment replacement rate – For example, in the UK the 
percentage of an average worker’s wage that would be replaced by unemployment benefits – provides a telling 
illustration. (the unemployment replacement rate)In the UK, the rate for one earner supporting a partner and two 
children declined from 69% in 1971 to 36% in 1990. For a single worker with no dependents, the decline was 
even more dramatic,: falling from 54% in 1971 to 20% or less from 1990 onwards (Scruggs et al., 2014).  
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This neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state has been analysed by some commentators as a shift from 
Keynesian welfare state capitalism, which could afford and required a high level of public welfare expenditure, 
to a system of ‘workfare state capitalism’, in which high welfare expenditure is considered to be incompatible to 
with a profitable economy (Jessop, 1991). Workfare state capitalism is characterizsed by decentralizsation and 
welfare pluralism (with a strong role for the private sector), the promotion of labour market flexibility, supply -
side economics, the subordination of social policy to the market demands of the market, and a desire to 
minimizse social expenditure. Like welfare states, there are variants on the workfare model, reflecting the 
ongoing influence of historical constraints presented by the policy hangover of existing welfare state regime 
structures and politics, alongside inter-state variations in public opinion between countries and regime 
differences by regime in policy responses to common challenges (Jessop, 1991).  The neo-Lliberal workfare 
state emphasizses the privatizingsation of state enterprise and welfare services and the deregulationg of the 
private sector (Jessop, 1991). 
 
Since the 2007/8 financial crisis, the austerity policiesy of austerity pursued by the UK government haves led to 
further welfare state reforms along advancing the neoliberal model, – what has been termed neoliberalism 2.0 
(Schrecker and Bambra, 2 2015). The financial crisis of 2007 was a result oftriggered by a downturn in the USA 
housing market, which led toinducing a massive collapse in financial markets across the world. Banks 
increasingly required state bailouts: for example, (e.g. in the UK the retail bank Northern Rock was 
nationalizsed in the UK, whilst in the USA Lehmann Brothers investment bank filed for bankruptcy and the 
mortgage companies Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were given major government bailouts  in the USA). Stock 
markets fell precipitously posted massive falls which continued as the effects in the ‘real’ economy began to be 
felt, with unemployment rates of overexceeding 10% in the USA and the Euro-zone. In 2009, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that the global economy was experiencing its worst period for 60 years  
(Gamble, 2 2009). The global economic recession continued throughout 2009 and 2010. and wAlthoughhilst 
many wealthy governments injected liquidity into their economies (so-called quantitative easing), it this was 
also accompanied in many European countries (including the UK, but most notably in Greece and Spain) by 
escalating public expenditure cuts: austerity.  
 
The UK, whilst not asThough less affected as than the Eurozone by the financial crisis and subsequent 
recession, the UK still embarked on a programme of austerity. Here, tFromhe 2010 to 20-15, the Ccoalition 
government (of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) and then the Conservative majority government 
elected in 2015, enacted large- scale cuts to central and local government budgets, increased health service 
(NHS) privatizsation, as well asand made making steep reductions incuts to welfare services and benefits 
(including those for people with disabilities). It has been estimated that Tthe UK welfare reforms enacted up to 
2015 will take nearly £19bn a year out of the economy by 2020 (Beatty and Fothergill, 2016). This is equivalent 
to around £470 a year for every working-age adult of working age in the country. The biggest financial losses 
arise from reforms to disability-related benefits, estimated at (£4.3bn a year) (Beatty and Fothergill, 2 2016). In 
England, Llocal government spending (which includes social care) also fell by nearly 30% in real terms between 
2008 and 2015 in England. With the austerity programme continuing since the Conservatives won an electoral 
majority in 2015, Tthis is the wider neoliberal context within which UK disability and rehabilitation policy has 
developed.  
 
4.3.2 Reasserting labour discipline and no longer deserving 
Regarding UK disability policy, There are two particular trends within the wider neo-liberaliszation of the 
welfare state require particular attentionthat need to be emphasised in relation to disability policy in the UK: the 
reassertion of labour discipline and the shift from “‘deserving”’ to “‘undeserving”’ poor (Bambra and Smith, 2 
2010). The reforms to disability-related welfare benefits can be conceptualizsed as part of the trend of 
reasserting labour discipline and instilling the work ethic, accompanied by; whilst there is also a notable shift in 
categorisation and the language in terms offor classifying disability-related benefit recipients, who are now as 
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no longer perceived as deserving of public/welfare state support.  This discourse and the associated policy 
changes impact on all people with a disability, – particularly people those with poor mental health (and other 
‘hidden disabilities’) or musculoskeletal problems. However, whilst those with very complicated or severe 
disabilities (e.g. as a resulting from of an accidents or terminal conditions such as cancer) receive more public 
sympathy and support, they are still subject to the same surveillance regime and poverty - level benefits (see, 
e.g.,for example The Independent, 2 2016, March 17).  
 
There are four salient aspects of the labour discipline thesis for UK disability policy.: Firstly, commentators 
such as Ginsburg argue that the social security benefits system disciplines the labour force by attaching 
conditions to benefits, which ‘ensure that the intransigent worker cannot so easily turn to the welfare state for 
support’ (Ginsburg, 1979). This aspect of the labour discipline thesisreasoning is evident in the UK reforms, as 
recipients of the Employment and Support AllowanceESA will have to takemust participate in employability 
schemes in order to receive full benefits. Secondly, following Piven and Cloward (1971), the reforms can be 
seen as part of a wider welfare state retrenchment, as whereby welfare provision acts as a means ofserve to 
‘regulateing the poor’.  HenceOn this basis, provision tends to be expanded during at times of political unrest 
and subsequently reduced once a measure of social peace has beenis restored. For example, in the USA, the civil 
unrest in of the USA in the 1960s was associated with a subsequent expansion of the welfare state, which, once 
social order was restored, was followed up by a series of cut backs under the 1980s Reagan administration  after 
social order had been restored. Given thatSince the UK has recently experienced a period of relative ‘peace’, it 
might be expected that for welfare benefits would nowto be cut back, – with the financial crisis and austerity 
programme providing a narrative cloak. Thirdly, Katz (1986) argues that the stigma associated with benefit 
receipt also acts as aserves to discipline upon the labour force, with dependency on state benefits considered not 
only a misfortune but also a moral failure. The tiered approach of the Employment and Support AllowanceESA 
system to claimants may heighten this aspect of labour discipline, with those deemed ‘sick but able to work’ 
feeling particularly stigmatiszed. Finally, as Byrne (2005)’s work has showncontends (2005), the last two 
decades’  reforms to welfare provision of the last two decades in the UK and elsewhere (particularly the USA) 
have aimed not been aboutto ending benefit dependency but about to linking benefit receipt more closely to 
work. The welfare reforms can, thus, be seen as the somewhat logical extension of the usinge of the benefits 
system to assert the work ethic. The reforms similarly reinforce divisions of who is (working poor) and who is 
not (non-working poor) deserving of state support. 
 
The separation of disability-related claims into two distinct categories of deserving and less- or non-deserving 
is, on the one hand, a logical consequence of the welfare reform philosophy of “‘work for those who can, 
welfare for those who cannot”’. It also approach to welfare reform and an acknowledgesment that previous, 
more passive approaches have often exacerbated the labour market exclusion experienced by people with a 
disability or chronic illness (Barnes, 1991). However, oOn the other hand, the division into two levels of 
benefits is inevitably tied into notions of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor  (Katz, 1986; van Oorschot, 2 
2006). Disability-related benefits were the last in the UK system to be the subject of extensively reformed and, 
until recently, did not attract as much popular stigma as other benefit types of benefits (most notably lone- 
parent benefits). This is also the case in other countries, where people in receivingpt of benefits due to ill health 
or disability have been viewed and treated as more ‘deserving’ or morally worthy than those in receiptrecipients 
of other types of benefit (van Oorschot, 2 2006). Indeed, as Stone arguesd in ‘The Disabled State’ (1986), in 
many Western countries, disability was for a long time considered to be a special administrative category in the 
welfare states of many Western countries, and one which came with distinctive entitlements in the form of 
social aid and exemptions from certain obligations of citizenship, such as the duty to work (Stone, 1986, p.: 4). 
Welfare reform in this area can, thus, be seen as a clear move awaydeparture from the more accommodating 
perspective of the period of ‘passive welfare’ period, and as a new political discourse which dictates that certain 
types of disability are less deserving of public support than others.  
 
People with a disability or chronic illness are thus variously categorizsed and re-categoriszed within the 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor dichotomy. The relations of production which arose from capitalist 
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industrializsation established a discourse of ‘able-bodiedness’ which excluded the impaired and the chronically 
ill from the workplace and the general discourse of employability in general (Oliver, 1990; Stone, 1986).  
However, this has been renegotiated at various times and on different terms. For example, the context of the 
Second World War forced employers to employ recruit groups who were not traditionally regarded as 
unemployable, such as women or people with disabilities. The Disabled Persons (Employment) Act of 1944 
established the long-term sick and disabled as the ‘deserving’ poor. What is clear iIn the welfare reforms 
implemented since the 1990s, has been the renegotiation of this ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ dichotomy has 
clearly been renegotiated. This redrawing was gradual, - initially,with those who were defined as ‘sick but not 
disabled’ were the first to be moved out offrom the ‘deserving’ and into the ‘undeserving’ poor category (the 
ESA Work Related Activity group). Next, tThe workfare reforms implemented since the early 2000s then led to 
nearly all people with a disability being put into this recategorizedy (as the threshold for getting receiving 
unconditional support became much harder to meet). Further, the programme of austerity, with its associated 
sweeping benefit cuts across the board, started a process whereby even those considered ‘deserving’ of 
unconditional support, saw had their entitlements  levels of that support significantly curtaileddecreased. This 
has arguably diminished the status of people with a disability and subjected them to significant new levels of 
surveillance, – previously reserved for the able-bodied ‘undeserving’ poor (Katz, 1986).  
 
4.4 ConclusionCONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined vocational rehabilitation services and support for people with disabilities in the UK, 
– placing them within a wider welfare, labour market, and social policy context. It has provided an overviewed 
of the historical evolution of social policy in the UK in regardings to the employment of people with a disability, 
- considering four key phases: from the passive welfare of the 1970s and 1980s (typified by compulsory 
employment quotas and passive welfare benefits); through the active welfare of the 1990s and early 2000s 
(including antidiscrimination legislation, welfare to work, and active welfare benefits);, to the workfare 
approach of the mid-2000s (typified by conditionality and compulsory work-for-benefit); and through to the 
austerity phase since 2011 (typified by sanctions, reductions, and restrictions). It has analysed tThese policy 
changes have been analysed from a political economy perspective, – exploring the broader context of the 
neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state and the specific issues of the reassertiong of labour discipline and 
the reclassifyingication of people with a disability from ‘deserving’ to ‘undeserving’ subjects. Disability and 
rehabilitation policy in the UK has shifted radically, particularly since the 1990s. However, the effects of these 
reforms on employment rates and labour market inclusion has been very limited; instead, and they have thereby 
only served to further marginalizse and stigmatisze disabled people.   
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